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"Nobody can rule guiltlessly" Saint-Just 
-I 
It is a paradox that civil liberties, which grew and 
flourished under the parliamentary system, have been 
endangered in recent decades by executive activities 
professedly directed towards the preservation of that 
system. The uncertainty and suspicion aroused by 
ideological differences between the "Great Powers" has, 
throughout the world, given rise to 11 securi ty" and 11 loyalty" 
programmes of varying dimension and intensity. It is the 
intention of this article to examine, within the framework 
of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act of 
1969, the conflicts, between State and individual interests, 
which are inherent in matters of national security. 
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I. THE ORIGIN AND OPERATIONS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE 
The New Zealand Security Service had its genesis in an 
unpublished Order in Council of the 26th of November, 1958. 
Its organisation was modelled closely both in procedure and 
aims on that of the British Organisation known as the MI5. 
The Service performs a number of distinct functions. Primarily 
it is an agency which collects and collates information~ to be 
used in vetting procedures, in the surveillance of certain 
organisations, in the briefing of departmental heads and 
ministers of the Crown, and in pursuing counter-espionage 
activities. The Service also acts as an advisory body for 
the installing of "physical security" systems intended to 
protect certain installations and offices from any intruders. 
For obvious reasons, there is little precise information 
on how these various functions are performed. However, the 
Wh(~ 0 C.CMp 'J .. <4~ q 
vetting procedures, witA a substantial portion of the efforts 
of the Service, and are, moreover, fundamental to any analysis 
of individual rights in this area, may serve as an illustration. 
The procedure is twofold:-
(1) Negative Vetting: This chiefly, although not exclusivelyY 
concerns prospective employees in the Armed Forces and the Police. 
Immigrants and applicants for naturalisation receive similar 
checks. No approach is made to the person concerned. The 
employing authority or department concerned forwards the necessary 
particulars to the Service, which then makes a check against its 
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files. Occasionally access may be had to Police files. If 
clearance is given the files relating to the person concerned 
are destroyed. If any doubt arises whether or not to give 
security clearance, further inquiries will be made. In such 
circu~stances third persons could be approached. If the 
doubts cannot be resolved, the difficulty will be made clear 
to the authority concerned. No evaluation is offered, but 
bQ.~, .. the Service will make a recommendation on the~ of the 
substantiated material it has assembled, if the authority 
involved so requests. 
(2) Positive Vetting: This procedure is restricted to 
those who have regular and constant access to "sensitive inform-
ation". Generally this will involve most Officers of the Armed 
Forces but only the higher echelons of government departments. 
However, some departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, require 'positive' clearance for nearly all employees. 
- ~c.-
Some employees are subject toA vetting every five years. The 
material which is the foundation of any report made to the 
departmental head concerned, is obtained from a standard form, 
/ clearly entitled "Security Questionnaire", and is prefaced by the words 
"Yo1.1r (prospective) employment puts you in touch with information of 
outstanding importance from the point of view of national security, 
and it is Government policy that special enquiries must be made 
about the reliability of those in such employment." This preface 
reiterates that the material is to be used for security purposes 
only. Clearly, hence, the person concerned is made fully aware 
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of what is involved. Various routine particulars are required~ 
but the se which would possibly be remarked on include inquiries 
regarding countries visited or resided in, and relatives resident 
in countries outside the Commonwealth. Four references are 
required, and these, it is stipulated, must be people well 
acquainted "in private life" with the person completing the 
form, and capable of vouching as to his or her "character". 
Of particular interest are the questions pertaining to political 
affiliations and connections. Predictably the Communist Party 
and pro-Facist organisations are mentioned. Some indication is 
given of the organisations which are considered to be "associated 
or in sympathy with" the Communist movement. It is significant 
that the form specifically indicates that "membership or assoc-
iation" in these latter organisations "does not necessarily 
- 2 prevent Security clearance." 
1
These include marital status, birth and nationality details, 
residential addresses, employment records and education records, 
and particulars concerning the father, mother, spouse, brothers 
and sisters of the person concerned. 
2The Canadian "Report of the Royal Commission on Security" (June 
1969) recommends at P• 35 categorically, that any present member-
ship in an "affiliated" organisation (or anyone who "by his words 
or actions" shows himself to support such an organisation) should 
f automatically preclude employment in areas where access may be 
had to classified informationo 
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People named in the questionnaire may themselves be subject 
to negative vetting. Material gleaned in interviews with 
refere~ e : ~ will be evaluated in the context of information 
obtained from other sources. The prime purpose of inquiries 
as to character and associations, is to assess the "reliability" 
/ and personal qualities of the subject. J To this end, no partic-
ular factor, beyond that as present membership of the Communist 
Party, will preclude security clearance. Nor will any allegations 
unearthed be considered conclusive. If further investigation does 
not clear up any dubious matter, an interview with the person 
concerned may follow. Ultimately however, in such circumstances, 
the matter will be outlined in the report made to the Departmental 
Head, who must make the final decision on the initial report and 
any subsequent recommendation.
4 
J 
4concern has been voiced in some quarters on the attitude taken by 
the Service to activities of job applicants during their years at 
Universityo The attitude of Canadian 11Royal Commission" op. eit. 
( at P• 3 -r ) is that "the positions taken by young and enquiring minds 
should not be held flagainst" them in later years ••.•• Questionable 
university associations or activities should not necessarily bar an 
individual from government employment." It has been indicated to 
the writer by the Service that this is an adequate summary of the 
New Zealand attitude to the question. 
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Character investigation is intended to perform a twofold 
function. It not only seeks to establish personal integrity, 
but also to reveal any predilections or personal defects, in the 
subject of the enquiries (or amongst his close family) which 
could make him susceptible to pressure. 5 
Considerable comment has been aroused by the indication in 
Parliament that 18000 "investigations" were made in one recent 
calendar year.P Such figures are a distortion as they include 
revetting and a minimum of four negative vettin~ (of the referees) 
for each positive vetting made. Normally the Service will make in the 
region of 2500 checks under the negative procedure. This will 
include a large number of checks on applicants for naturalisation and 
immigration. Positive checks will be made on about 1300 to 1400 
people each yearo 
5ncanadian "Report" op. cit. (at P• 3w ). Special mention is made 
of homosexuality, which is not considered a bar for a low level 
of clearance. However clearance "should not normally be granted 
clearance to higher level." Once again it has been indicated that 
this indicates general security criteria in New Zealand. 
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II. A STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE SERVICE 
The Draft Bill: 
The vociferous criticism to which the Service has been subject 
since its inception reached its zenith in the "Godfrey" incident 
and the 11 Laurenson11 affair, both of which involved Universities and 
'l"tl\('rop~ 
raised questions of em~leye~ conduct. It would be a sterile exercise 
to examine the validity of the specific allegations directed at the 
Service; of greater importance than the furore aroused on those 
occasions was the air of sensation and suspicion which had come to 
surround security activities. The culmination of this public concern 
was the introduction of a Bill avowedly modelled in most material 
aspects on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1956. 
The ostensible intention of this Bill was to assuage criticism of the 
anomalous standing of the Service, a creature neither of statute nor of 
ofer, lleo/ 
the common law, but daRied from the prerogative powers of the Crown to 
defend the realm. Substantially the Bill contained nothing which had 
not already been encapsulated in the equivaruent Australian Act. 7 
7 With the exception of a personation clause, ultimately enacted 
as s.13. 
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Critics could be forgiven for considering this a rather jejun~ and 
insubstantial legislative exercise; and predictably it did not placate 
those concerned with security service activities. 8 
The Act: 
"The further Parliament and the administration go to show that they 
are doing all they can to protect the interests and rights of the 
citizen, the more we encourage the growth of confidence in the Service. 119 
Mr Kirk's words would seem to indicate the consideration which persuaded 
Government to implement the considerable alterations and extensions 
found in the final enactment. It is, however, important that any 
attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of national security 
and civil liberties must do =r than lull or beguile. Furthermore, 
an enactment such as this, which give& wide discretionary powers, must 
be preceded by debate and discussion of sufficient thoroughness to 
reveal not only substantial reasons for such discretion, but also some 
assurance that it will be exercised judiciously and responsibly. 
8 Notably missing was (a) any mention of ministerial control (see po 
post); (b) any indication of methods to be utilised in performance of 
the Serviee's functions; (c) any definition of "subversion", at that 
time undefined either by statute or by the Courts (seep. 
(d) any appeal procedure. 
9 Parliamentary Debates. Vol -3 '"':t °'-~I° ."A.&"f.S" · 
post); 
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Assurance as to the taintless nature of past conduct cannot be accepted 
as an adequate saf'eguard for the future. It is for those who wish to 
enact measures which counternance a diminution of civil liberties to 
defend such infringment. If any Government wishes to cloak executive 
discretion in a mantle of "security"' it must justify such unnatural 
sacrosanctity, and provide adequate protection for individual interests. 
Such considerations a.re germane to the comment which follows 0 
"Security": 
Fundamental to the whole Act is the definition of "security" given 
. t· two 10 in sec ion , 
and subversiono 
the three ingredients of which are espionage , sabotage 
Few could or have C:qv,·ueo( at the inclusion of espionage 
and sabotage as both terms have been defined by reference to other statutes 
10 and are susceptible to further elucidation by the Courts. It should 
however be noted that some difficulties could still arise from the 
definition of "espionage. 1111 Unauthorised disclosures within the Official 
Secrets Act 1951 could conceivably include numerous acts , from loose talk 
101111 Security11 means the protection of New Zealand from acts of espionage , 
sabotage , and subversion, whether or not it is directed from or intended to 
be committed V'li thin New Zealand." The words "acts of" were included on the 
motion of Dr Findlay, M.P. on the grounds th..at this would be "clear and 
valuable warning that the Service is concerned with overt actions" aloneo 
11 In the draf't Bill "espionage" and "sabotage" were left undefined. In the 
Act the former is defined as any "offence against the Official Secreta Act 
1951 which could benefit the Government of any country other than New Zealand." 
The latter is defined as''any offence against Section 79 of the Crimes Act 1961 ." 
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in a pub, to the peccadilloes of a assalL Sweeping provisions such as 
these are manifestly intended to be reserve powers, to be invoked only in 
exceptional circumstanceso It is not pertinent within this article to 
question whetr.er such considerable powers are desirableo Arguably however, 
the Service, to fulfil its functions, is obliged to safeguard against all 
breaches of the Off~cial Secrets Act 195i which come within the definition 
given.
11 
Such a responsibility, if judiciously and sensibly exercised, is 
of the very essence of security activitieso At point, however, here and 
elsewhere, is the lack of external supervision of the Service, which the 
Act, arguably, does not adequately remedyo 
Sabotage, as defined in the Crimes Act 1961, relates only to any Act 
which prejudices the safety, security or defence of New Zealand, but does 
not include any Act of industrial sabotage by way of strike or lockouto 
"Subversion" was undefined in the draft Bill, and the definition
12 
would appear to follow on submissions made to the Statutes Revision 
SUbVO.. e. 
The term II sul3v8r~ue11 is one which has such ill-defined Committee. 
limits, and has been used so indiscriminately, that it is not surprising 
that concern was expressed at its inclusion in a Bill vrhich purport:i&g 
to delineate and give statutory substance to tre operations of a hitherto 
arcane body. As was indicated in one submission to the Statutory Revision 
Committee, 13 the adoption of the definition of subversion given in the 
Concise Oxf'ord Dictionary,14 would, by its comprehensive coverage, give 
11 
(See P• 8) 
12 Contained in S.2 of the Act. 
13 That of Mr Christopher V/ainwright. 
14 
"subversion": to overturn, upset, effect destruction or overthrow of' 
religion, monarchy, the constitution, principles, morality." 
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the Director sufficient justification for investigations into 
almost any political activity. In such a situation, in the absence 
of statutory clarification there ~would appear to be three options; 
the Director could either use a subjective test of his own, or he 
+h~ 
could seek to giveAcolour of objectivity by adopting someone 
else's, or by divining what would constitute, in majority opinion, 
subversive behaviour. Whatever course was chosen would be 
fraught with difficul~~. The first option would cause the 
Service's activities to va ... ~ , as it were, with the Chancellor's 
foot. The last option could conceivably give an unnecessarily 
wide ambit to security investigations, with a concomittantly 
stultifying effect on divergent opinion. 
However "subversion" was interpreted there would have been 
little opportunity for supervision, or alteration in attitudes, 
as the structure of the Act was inimical to any review. The 
Director was placed in an invidious position; should the 
activities of the Service inadvertently become public, it could 
readily be claimed that there had been an abuse of discretion, 
given the equivocal and ambiguous nature of the term "subversion". 
Further, to proscribe subversive activities, in such an undefined 
way, and subject them to surveillance, is to circumscribe rights 
of privacy, reputation and freedom of expression, without giving 
the individual opportunity either to regulate his behaviour 
according to defined standards, or to ascertain and refute any 
allegations made. 
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In the Act subversion is defined as "attempting, inciting, 
counselling, advocating, or encouraging -
(a) The overthrow by force of the Government of New Zealand, or 
(b) The undermining by unlawful means of the authority of the State 
in New Zealand." 
To what extent does this definition obviate the difficulties 
outlined above? 
The definition is clearly related to the crimes of treason15 
15 11 S.B. Treason - Everyone owing allegiance to Her Majesty the 
Queen in sight 
New Zealand -
of New Zealand commits treason who, within or without 
(a) kills or wounds or does grievous bodily harm to Her Majesty the 
Qheen •••••••••• ; or, 
(b) was against New Zealand. 
(c) Assists an enemy at war with New Zealand, or any armed forces 
again.et which New Zealand forces are engaged in hostilities ••••• ; or 
(d) invites or assists any person with force to invade New Zealand; or 
(e) uses force for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of New 
Zealand; or 
(f) conspires with any person to do anything mentioned in this section. 
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and sedition as outlined in the Crimes Act 1961, which offences 
encompass the major elements of subversion. No mention is made 
in the sections concerned of "counselling" or "advocating", 
However, the former term is implicitly included by virtue -of s.66 
(d) of the Crimes Act which stipulates that everyone a party to 
and guilty of an offence who "incites counsels or procures any 
person to commit the offence.". Does the inclusion of "advocating 
extend the legitimate surveillance activities of the Service to 
1 I.81 Seditious offences defined: (1) A seditious intention as an 
intention - (a) to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite dis-
affection against•••• the Government of New Zealand, or the admin-
istration of justice; or 
(b) to invite the public or persons , or any class of 
persons to procure otherwise than by lawful means the alteration 
of any matter affecting the Constitution, laws, or Government of 
New Zealand 
(c) to invite, procure, or encourage violence, lawless-
ness or disorder 
(d) to incite ••• commission of any offence ••• 
prejudicial to public safety or to the maintenance of public order; 
or 
(e) to excite such hostility or ill-will between different 
classes of persons as may endanger the public safety. 
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c.r.·n\es 
matters which are not eri-me? In Baker17 Mr Justice Cooper held 
that counselling was more restricted than giving information, 
and stated that the preferred definition was that of Stephen 
in his "Digest of Criminal Law", wherein counselling was considered 
equivalent to "instigating". Instigation clearly includes an 
element of inflammatory behaviour. Arguably, however, advocacy 
is more limited than this, and is ambivalent, for it may or may 
not seek to instigate or incite. The distinction is admittedly 
fine, and it turns on the level of "abstraction" of the activity 
concerned. Advocacy is essentially a public activity, as 
oppos,d to the clandestine nature of counselling; further it does 
not involve the element of personal assistance which seems inherent 
in "counselling". Conceivably, hence, advocacy includes activities 
which do not necessarily involve a breach of the law. The 
deleterious effect of including such a term, which is not defined, 
nor subject to the interpretation of the courts; has been outlined 
18 above. Such uncertainty could conceivably inhibit free discussion, 
for it would be easy to misconstrue the definition of subversion, and 
countenance (or fear) the surveillance of public discussion and study. 
It is interesting to note in this context that it is sufficient 
to keep to "undermine ••• the authority of the State. 1119 To commit 
a seditious offence however, one must seek to alter••••• the 
Constitution, laws or Government.~
6 
Presumably, to satirise or 
16 See P• 12) 
17 
(1909) 28. N.Z. L.R. 536. 
19 s.2. of the Security Intelligence 
Service Act. 
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ridicule the New Zealand Government could undermine the authority 
of the State. Where such activities are carried out by means 
of underground or proscribed magazines, illegal broadcasts, or 
performances which are considered scandalous, defamatory or 
obscene, they could be regarded as subversive. It would seem, 
hence, one might invite the attentions of the Service not only by 
undermining the State itself, but endangering something much more 
nebulous, its "authority". This characteristic, or "aura" of the 
State stems not only from its statutory powers, but also from the 
subjective attitudes of every subject. The Service hence has the 
'EJ""Q,,°' ,-.... ~ 
function of according the morale and "esprit de corps" of the State, 
the emanation of its powers. 
Arguably it would have been wiser to confine the activities 
which the Service has a duty to investigate to those which are 
already illegal. The wider the functions of the Service are, 
the greater its intrusion on political activity must necessarily be. 
To return to the question of whether the definition has 
obviated the difficulties involved in such an intangible term as 
subversion. 
It is clear a large area of the activities of the Service will 
concern illegal activities alone. Any redress against unnecessary 
infringment and any chance that an individual has to defend himself 
against allegations will be discussed in the section of this article 
20 
which relates to the appeal procedure. 
20 
See P• -. a e..+ s~. 
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The difficulty of review of the general performance of duties 
undeF this definition will be dealt with in relation to ministerial 
control and responsibility. 21 One further problem has arisen 
in the discussion of "advocacy", that n-f' the difficulties 
inherent in deciding whether or not a particular activity is 
lawful. The difficulty has been mitigated by the provision of 
a definition of "subversion". 
leave some 11 penumbral 11 areas. 
Nevertheless the changes instituted 
For example, the law relating to 
demonstrations is by no means clear. It is certain however that 
some people involved in such activities do not act within the lawo 
Could it be argued that those who counsel others to take part in 
civil disobedience are encouraging the "undermining •••• of the 
authority of the State."? Given the increasing incidence of 
arrests in demonstrations it could conceivably be argued that such 
forms of protest necessarily entail an assault on State authority. 
A further example may be found in the industrial field. 
Strikes and lockouts, as defined in the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1954, are, in certain situations, illegal 
activities. On occasions such industrial disputes have been 
regarded by large segments of the population as blatant attempts 
to undermine the State. 
21 
See P• •~e* s~ 
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Could these difficulties have been avoided? The Statutes 
Revision Committee specifically rejected any suggestion that 
"subversion" be replaced by sedition and treason. The Chairman 
of ~ Committee indicated that the provisions of the Crimes 
Act relating to those offences were insufficiently wide to protect 
the State against 11 deliberate undermining" and "carefully 
22 
planned plots." 
One possible solution presents itself; that it would have been more 
advisable to limit the investigatorj functions of the Service to 
treason~s and seditious acts. This course would have two marked 
advantages. The first is that both terms have been the subject 
of judicial interpretation, and have been reasonably clearly 
delineated. The second is that to commit a seditious offence one 
must have a seditious intent, and no-one shall be deemed to have such 
where he acted in good faith, intending either 
11 (a) to show that Her 
Majesty has been misled or mistaken; or (b) to point out errors 
or defects inthe Government or Constitution of New Zealand, or in 
the administration of justice; or to incite the public, or any person, 
or any class of persons to attempt to procure by lawful means the 
alteration of any matter affecting the Constitution, laws or Govern-
ment of New Zealand; or (a) to point out, with a view to their 
22 Parliamentary Debates .UP.~':~~l1ct3.Having countenanced the subjection 
of the citizen to surveillance for activities which it was admitted quite 
possibly did not involve any breach of the law, the Chairman affirmed 
that the most valuable of this country's political traditions were 
"the rule of law and the established rights and liberties of the 
subject"l 
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removal , matters producing or having a tendency to produce feelings 
of hostility or ill- rill between dif'ferent classes of persons .
11 23 
No such safeguard is included in the definition of "subversion" 
ahich could preclude any person from being labelled a subversive , and 
suf'fering accordingly. All those activities encompassed by S. 81 are 
unlawful . It has been argued above that "subversion" does include 
activities which are lavvf'ul. Do the provisions of S.81, however , 
include activities which do not seek to undermine "the authority of the 
State" . In other words could the substitution of sedition for 
subversion widen the area with which the Servic e could be concerned? 
Arguably yes, for paragraphs (c) and (e) of subsection one of S.81
24 
involve matters .rhich do not necessarily involve tre State's authority 
directly. 
In considering the offence of sed:i::tion in contrast to "subversion" 
the safeguard contained ih subsect.ion two would be a material improvement 
only in so much as it provides that there is no seditious intent where a: 
person intends to show in good faith that Her lrlajesty has been misled or 
mistaken, or to point out errors or defects in the Government, or 
Constitution or administration of justice. C Nevertheless , such activities 
outlined could, without this saving proviso have been deemed unlavvf'ul 
and seditious . 25..J 
23 s . 81 (2) Crimes Act 1961. 
21.1- Op . ci t. f- I&, · 
25 These activities could still be unlawf'ul if not seditious, andhence fall 
within the present definition of subversion, i . e . painting politically 
inflannnatory slogans 0 
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It is notable that sedition and subversion, as def'ined by statute, 
make reference to "lawful" and "unlawful" meanso .An attempt has been 
made above to indicate the problems which such phrases present . The 
recurring difficulty in the administration of an Act such as the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act is that there is little 
likelihood that any administrative decision as to what constitutes an 
unlawful act, will be open to judicial interpretation. The substitution 
of "seditious off'ences" for "subversion" would offer only a marginal 
possibility of clear definition in this area, and could at the same time 
widen the areas in which the Security Service would be competent to 
investigateo 
It is suggested that the most feasible improvements to the present 
def'ini tion of' "subversion" could be "1ro11~ht by the omission of the word 
"advocating11 ,
26 
and the inclusion of a saving proviso similar to that 
contained in S. 81 (2) (a) and (b) of' the Crimes Act 1961. 
The Functions of the Service: 
Statutory provision for these is made in section four of' the Acto 
The draft Bill made no specific reference to ministerial control. As 
the section now stands, the various provisions are all pref'aced by the 
words "subject to the control of' the Minister." This alteration, while 
still potentially contentious , was intended to answer those critics who 
had attacked the unleashed and unsupervised discretion of the Director. 
In this context, \7hat is meant by the term ministerial control? 
Implicit in the concept of' ministerial control in a democracy is the 
correlative concept of ministerial responsibilityo 
26 See p . t :Z.. ante o 
/ 
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"Once discretionary powers have been conferred, their exercise by 
departmental of'f'icers - and their Ministers - is subject to parliamentary 
control under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. The procedures 
available include direct approaches by the person affected to his 
Member of Parliament, or to the Ministero These approaches can be 
satisfied without ref'erence to the House of Representatives; or the 
Member may choose to raise the matter in the House by one of' the procedures 
available. 1127 Under the Security Intelligence Service Act an individual 
is given an opportunity to appeal where he f'eels that his career or 
livelihood has been adversely affected. 28 What however if he wishes to 
have the matter publicly debated, indicating as it might, gross abuses 
on the part of the Service? The matter may be raised in the House, but 
it is dubious whether it could possibly be the subject of' full and informed 
debateo A member may ask a question or request clarification, but 
whether or not he receives an adequate reply, is, as always, up to the 
Minister. The crucial diff'erence in the area. is, hol"lever, the canplete 
secrecy which slll~rounds the Servi.Ceo Any inquiries may be def'lected 
on the basis that a reply would be prejudicial to national securityo 
27 Robson: "The British Commonwealth: The Development of its laws and 
Constitutions: New Zealand" p.122. 
- 20 -
l'heref'ore., it is only in exceptionall_y f'lagrant cases that a Member 
will have suf'f'icient evidence to demonstrate the Service has exceeded 
its authority. The precise limits of' the Service's competence , were ., 
prior to the Act , extraordinarily unclear. The discretions enshrined 
in section four to a considerable extent eviscerates this section's 
apparent embodiment of' the Service's .f'unctions. A member who seeks to 
criticise a particular action is piliaced, except in the most blatant 
situations , in the invidious position of' attacking an extremely ,•ride 
discretionary power. 
29 So4. (1) ...• the functions of' the •••• service shall be -
(a) To obtain,correlate , and evaluate intelligence relevant to security, 
and to conmunicate any such intelligence to such persons, and in such 
manner, as the Director considers to be in the interests of security. 
(b) To advise Ministers of' the Crovm, where the Director is satisfied 
that it is necessary or desirable to do so , in respect of' matters 
relevant to security, so far as those matters relate to Departments or 
branches.of the State Services of' which they are in charge . 
(c) To co-operate as far as practicable and necessary with State Services 
and other public authorities in New Zealand and abroad as are capable 
of' assisting the •••• service in tj1e perf'onnance of' its functions. 
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Somewhat similar problems will arise v,hen a member on his own 
behalf', or at the behest of' his Party, seeks to elicit inf'ormation 
about, f'or example, the way in which the Service's vote is spent, 
or the reason f'or a particular action, or possibly, an indication of' 
policy on a vital issue. In most circumstances the Govenunent will 
seek to reassure the member. On occasions the candour of' the Executive 
on such matters has been creditable, and there has been less tendency 
in New Zealand, than in the United Kingdom, to invoke "national security" 
as a kind of' talisman to ward of'f' discussion of' any untov1ard incident. 
Nevertheless the secrecy and delicacy of' security matters militates 
against t he use of' the Parliamentary question as a means of' insuring 
ministerial responsibility to the House. More seriously there is no 
possibility of' general delate on the perf'onnance of' the Service, unless 
some scandal has occurred. The Service does not present an annual 
report on the basis of' which pertinent inquiries could be made and 
supervision exercised. There is no breakdown of' expenditure 
E~i~q+ 
(although this is now listed seperately in the #J'i!llilll_,,..-iwM11,:wa.,,l!IH.COJ1,. ). 
In short, and possibly f'or good reasons,
30 the Service is not susceptible 
to Parliamentary control, as it is normally exercised.
310 It is 
theref'ore misleading, except in a generalised s ense, to speak of' the 
Minister in charge of' the Securi "bJ Service as being
11 responsible 11 to 
Parliament. 
30 For example, the obvious need not to reveal sources of' inf'orma.tion, 
tactics , as distinct f'rom techniques, ~~~ investigations and detailed 
inf'ormation regarding particular directions of' activity. 
31 Not since some camnents made by Mr Fraser in debate in 1948 ( o. 15, 
p . 242) has any generalised discussion on the Service taken place (with the 
exception of' the debates preceding the Act), except where an indiscretion 
1hich has become public, lias served as a catalyst. 
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Given the singular nature of the Service's activities, is ministerial 
°'"' control, ( e'l.•eR th9Yg,iAits exercise is not subject to Parliamentary 
control in the usual fashion.) an adequate sat'eguard both of the indivldual 
and the public interest? In New Zealand the Service has traditionally 
been the responsiblity of the Prime Minister. Even if it were not so, 
the demands on any Minister's t:ime would probably tend to be rationed 
on the basis of the dimension of the activities contained in each port-
folio, and the extent to which the electorate expresses its concern or 
interest in the various matters under his care. In this context it 
is to be noted that the Service does not enter the public arena very 
often, its expenditure is sma11,
32 its procedures relatively routine. 
Furthennore, in one area of particular concern, the infringrnent of a 
person's rights in an individual instance, it would be unlikely a.nd f'Oas ib".:, 
impractical to expect reference to the Minister. The very multiplicity 
of activities covered by the words "espionage, sabotage and subversion" 
prevents effective ministerial control of discretion at the level where 
it most matters; the decision to investigate an individual's activities 
on the ground that they may come vri thin these headings o '.fuc practical 
implications of ministerial control within the context of the Service 
is that, of its very nature, supervision of only the most general 
nature will _be exercised. 33 
32~332,000 for this fiscal yearo 
33 .An example of this may be seen in 196"- The Prime Minister gave incorrect 
infonnation to the House on an incident concerning Service's activities on 
campus. Because of a misunderstanding nhich arose over a telephone con-
versation Ni th the Director a retraction had to be made. It was ~ obv,o'-b 
-+\...crl-
i'rom the Parliamentary Reports ~ the Prime Minister 1ras, on this matter 
at l east , completely uninformed as to Service procedure o(Po,rt ~•"'+.t_.~ Oc.lc:,qt~g 
3'+-1. Qt-f. ,~q-). 
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Possible cli.fficulties are best illustrated by analysing the various 
parts of section f'our . 34 Subsection (1) (a) outlines in skeletal 
form the Service ' s function as an inf'onnation agency. To some extent 
this provision ob:fuscates rather than clarif'ies tl~e position. No 
indication is given, even in generalised tenns , of hovr the Director 
may obtain his information. Presumably (al though it cannot be taken 
for granted) the Service will not breach the law. 35 'l'here remains 
hovrever various means of' obtaining inf'orrnation which are not specifically 
outlawed36 , or may be utilised if' approved by certain authorities. For 
.37 ~ wrli. .38 
exampl e , mail may be opened , and telephor::.e wire~..,,.... , if' a certain 
Oef>~~-t 
procedure is followed , and the approval of the 1'f••••u1r•:BB'1.6!MfiW}1.s 
obtained. 'l'here is no indication that "agents provocateurs" will not 
be used. A list of increasingly far- fetched examples could be enum-
erated, and the argument reduced to absurdity. 
to remember that £'ear feeds on suspicion • 
.34 Op . cit . 
It is therefore pertinent 
I 
35 Dr Findlay ( f'..a. ~bQ4.es ·"·?>'-~4+p211J produced a specimen contract of Service , 
which was said to indicate the grounds for dismissal of any officer . It 
includes as a ground "any conviction for a criminal offence ." (tLere is not 
however any specific mention of any breach of the law.) 
.36 For example the much famed electronic deviceso The utility of these 
according to the Director is exaggerated, as tt-eir instalment is a difficult 
and time- consuming procedure . Nor is their eff'iciendy guaranteed. 
3? Post Off'd:ice Actc-. ~If, 
.38 ~ .'iol\~ .A..~ 'tl.q'ttp"S t'f"1't/:t3't-(R.5~) 
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As has already been noted in this article , 39 one of the most compelling 
reasons for this legislation is to dispel unnecessary :fears and secrecy, 
and thereby facilitate the Service ' s per:fonnance of its function'i. A 
valuable opportunity was lost in this area , to make perfectly clear, 
considering the emphatically emphasised importanc e of the activities 
of' the Service , the necessity :for :flexibility in technique , and provide 
for their approval in each instance . 40 If a particular technique such as 
wire- tapping was not necessary, 41 then this should have been made evident. 
If it (or other methods) v,ere necessary, this shoul d , also , in a democracy, 
have been made clear o Sirnilar objections could be made to the word 
11 evaluate 11 o Here however the position is elucidated by the words which 
follow, i . e ••• o 11 infonnation relevant to security"~2 Presumably this 
39 P • 7. 
40 The Canadian Royal Cormnission Report (op. cit.) states at p . 102 that 
methods of interception are often the only effective means of safeguarding 
the State. On the question of telephone conversations and evesdropping 
the Report recanmends ministerial control ,(as opposed to the mooted judicial 
control). bvesdropping should only be used in exceptional circumstances , 
to be approved by the Director in each instance . 
should have ministerial approval in each instance . 
The opening of mail 
41 The Prime Minister (f.:.,.I ~ V,Jc>~~ has categorically denied that 
wire-tapping is utilised by the Service . 
42 Quaere : whether the v1ord "relevant" be construed as encompassing 
material , which , while not being evidence of espionage , sabotage or sub-
version, could provide circumstantial material of use in this field (for 
example , the personal characteristics of people enga~ed in suspect political 
activities , their social contacts and family connec tions )? 
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indicates that inf'ormation which did not further the statutory aims of the 
Service will be discarded. The criteria to be utilised are those 
outlined in the definition of security given in section twoo 
HoVI are the ·words II to communicate such intelligence to such persons 
and in such manner , as the Director considers to be in the interestf: 
of security to be construed? No limitation is placed on whom the 
Service may corrununicate security material , although S.4 (1) (b) and (c) 
indicate tl1e people and organisation that the Service has a primary dele-
gation to advise and co- operate with. There appears , however , to be 
some discrepancy bet,veen S. 4 (1) (a) and So4 (1) (c). Must the latter 
be considered an elaboration of the former , or is s.4 (1) (a) to be 
read as subject to So4 (1) (c) ? It is understood that the wide power 
of communication e;iven the Service is required in order that the Service 
may disclose the nature of their inquiries to peo le whose co-operation 
they wish to enlist in pursuirg their :i.rvestigations further o Never-
theless , as the section stands the Director would seem to have an 
unfettered discretion , as tc vrhom he may communicate security matters 
to (unless tbe l inister has specifjcally ordered othervrise).
43 
There is one further example of the difficulties involved in such 
opaque terminology. '/hat is meant by "public authorities in New 
Zealand and abroad •.••••• 11 7 On its face the phrase is no more than an 
~ Sktte... ~'S ~ol 
obvious recoe;nition of necessary co-operati01;,1 witl: our allies .overseas. 
It gives tacit approval for reciprocal assistance , However without 
43 Semble : mat guarantee (beyond that of the personal integrity of the 
members of' the Service) is there against anon)mous communication of Service 
material to employers , to trade unions officials or other inf'luential people? 
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adequate supervision, or statutory elaboration, there is no indication 
that material may not be provided on New Zealand citizens which 
would prevent the granting of visas (for example) by some countries. 
Such communication could be a serious impediment to the free move-
ment of the citizen, against which he has no redress, either under 
this Act, or quite probably under that of any other nation. 
A critic of the Act could be forgiven if he suspected that the 
motivation behind the generalities of the section was akin to that 
outlined in Machiavelli's instructions to Raffaello Girolami:-
"Occasionally words must serve to veil facts. But this must 
happen in such a way that no-one become aware of it; or if it should 
be noticed, excuses must be at hand immediately." 
Nevertheless the object behind the phasing of this section is A 
palpably obvious. The intention is to preserve the autonomy of the 
Service, and to allow it considerable flexibility. Section four, 
construed as an entity, would seem to indicate an intention to leave 
only crucial policy decisions to the Minister, and give the Director 
44 Wt'c+a.r 
The Director has indicated to the aeM er that in fact there is no 
communication with allies Cconcerning New Zealand citizens) purely for 
purposes of establishing whether or not that ally should grant a visa. 
o+hk 
'Me,A hypothetical examples given in the body of the article could 
possibly have been the subject of similar assurances. The purpose 
of 
the analysis however is to indicate the width of discretion and to 
underline the absence of genuine ministerial control. 
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unhindered control over the details. The rationale behin
d such 
a policy is indicated in two English statement
s on the subjecto 
The first is from Sir Findlater Stewart's Repo
rt of 1945. 
"But from the very nature of the work, need fo
r direction except 
on the very broadest line can never arise abov
e the level of 
Director-General. That appointment is one of great r
esponsibility ••• 
having got the right man there is no alternativ
e togtving him the 
widest discretion in the means he uses and the
 direction in which he 
applies them - always provided be does not step
 outside the lawo 11 
The second is contained in a directive given in
 1952 by the then Home 
Secretary Sir David Maxwell Fyfe to the Direct
or-General of the 
English equivalent of the Security Service: 
11 It is essential that 
the Security Service be kept absolutely free fr
om political bias 
or influence, and nothing should be done that migh
t lend any colour 
to any suggestion that it is concerned with the inte
rests of any 
particular segment of the community or with any ot
her matter than ,, 
the Defence of the Realm as a whole. 
The attitude is made clear in these two statem
ents. The 
Security Service must have some independence in
 order that it be 
evident it is not the "Secret Police" arm of a 
particular Government 
or faction. The Director has in his public 
pronouncements, gone to ~ i 
considerable pains to make this impartiality c
lear, even to the extent 
of indicating that the Prime Minister might no
t necessarily have access 
to all files in the Service's records.
45 
Patently such an attitude is not in accord with
 commonly accepted 
theories of Parliamentary democracy. The sin
gularity of the Service's 
45 New Zealand Weekly News.°l'411C- l&ih t't'=A. 
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duties cannot exempt the Service fro
m control, however 9 indirect, 
by elected representatives of the pe
ople. In some way a balance 
must be reached amongst the conflict
ing demands of independence, 
secrecy and responsibility. If the 
Director can in his own 
discretion withhold some matters fro
m the Minister (even if the 
grounds are that the request is imp
roper), then the ultimate 
answerabilityof the executive in thi
s area is endangered, and the 
considerable powers of clandestine s
urveillance are~~~ placed 
beyond Parliamentary control. It w
ould appear that any inter-
pretation of section four which wo
uld allow t his result is 
fallacious for it would promote not 
flexibility but licence. 
How then can abuse of the Service be
 avoided? To provide for 
fulsome annual reports, is obviously
 not the answer. Submissions were 
made to the Statutes Revission Comm
ittee recommending that a select 
committee (to include the Leader of 
the Opposition) ought to be 
responsible for ensuring that the Se
rvice performed its functions 
'°""'"~, .. 
adequately, and did not trespass bey
ond its jwris~iQtieH. The 
Leader of the Opposition during deb
ates on the Bill,
46 suggested that 
a person should be appointed who cou
ld, in complete confidence, 
ascertain from the Director an outli
ne of the work of the Service 
(that is, its methods of obtaining i
nformation and the criteria 
by which the relative importance or 
gravity of circumstances which 
engage the Service are assessed.) 
If a certain matter is one which 
would not justify the use of margin
ally accepted methods of collecting 
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information, the person designated could advise the Director to 
seek the written authority of the Minister. These suggestions 
are open to three objections. First, it does not solve the 
problem of a ministerial attempt to use the Service for partisan 
ends. Second, it could bender the responsibility vested in the 
Director nugatory. Third, the procedure, besides being cumbersom
e, 
could endanger t he reliance allies place on the Service as a body 
not subject to "Security leaks", because of its relatively close a
nd 
autonomous nature. 
The first objection could be met by making provision for the 
Director to report to Parliament directly, in grave and exceptional 
circumstances. The House could discuss the propriety of any 
ministeeial request in secret session. The second objection is
 
not so easily met. The conflict between the granting of a wide 
discretion, and the control of its exercise could be more readily 
reconciled if any action under the Statute was reviewable by the 
Courts. Except in exceptional circumstances however, any such
 
exercise will remain unknown to the public, and there will therefore 
b t . f j d " · 1 · 
47 
e no ques ion o any u icia review. The most practicable 
7 Circumstances cou+d arise in which Security Service activities 
patently exceeded any requirements of "security", e.go a request f
or 
information on which to establish a person's reliability, where t&
e-
MeR~~eR e~ the position concerned was not one in which national 
security could conceivably be involved. Possibly such an exercise
 of 
discretion could be subject to review by the courts. As to abuse 
of 
discretion see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltdi Wenesbury 
Corporation (1948) I.KB. 223 at 229. 
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safeguard would seem to be in the se
lection of officers of a high 
calibre, the development of procedu
res in accord with democratic 
traditions, and the establishment of
 a recognised convention of 
reference of new departures in prac
tice and policy to the Minister. 
Conversely the Minister, if he is al
ive to the issues involved 
in the exercise of the Service's fun
ctions, will subject the Service 
to regular scrutiny. The third ob
jection would seem a little 
specious and perhaps even presumptuo
us, for presumably any body 
or person appointed would perform th
eir functions discreetly, and 
with due regard to the secrecy of th
e material involved. 
The question of " ~ is custodiet cust
odi es?" remains. The best 
approximation to a pragmatic solutio
n is that mooted by Mr Kirk.
48 
The only other means of resolving th
e dilemma, would appear to be an 
emphasis on the quality of procedure
 and personnel as outlined in 
the preceding paragraph. 
Section four concludes with a subse
ction which is apparently 
designed to emphasise that the Secu
rity Service does not have police 
futtctions. It states: "It shall no
t be a function of the Security ,, 
Intelligence Service to enforce mea
sures for security. Should there 
be any need for example to execute a
 search warrant, under the Official 
Secrets Act, the Police will be used
 to perform this task. 
The Director and Officers of the Se
rvice: 
In submissions made to the Statutes 
Revision Committee some 
criticism was directed at the method
, outlined in sections f ive and 
six of the Act, of appointing the D
irector and officers of the Service. 
The contractual basis was considered
 inadvisable, for it was possible 
that some officers could see renewal
 of theif term of employment as 
Sw,efa.~"'" 
being dependent on their zeal and &e
PVJ.Ce-6 in uncovering subversives. 
As no indication was given in a sche
dule to the Bill of what kind of 
terms were included in the contract of
 service, commentators sought 
to cover any eventuality. The a
lmost inviolate nature of the presen
t 
Directors position, and that of some
 of his officers, it was submitted, 
Op. ci t. p. 2.9 . 
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was contrary to constitutional practice. No dismissal procedures 
were articulated, nor was there any indication that the contracts 
stipulated minimum standards of behaviour or adherence to prescribed 
procedure. This criticism went unheeded. It could have been 
avoided by providing in a schedule to the Act, specimen copies of the 
contracts of employment of officers and employees, in sufficient 
detail to indicate the grounds for dismissal, termination of contract, 
and any disciplinary action.
49 In the absence of any schedule, section 
eight of the Act provides a useful check, as it stipulates that the 
Chairman of the State Services Commission must concur in any terms 
or conditions determined by the Director. It is notable that by 
9 Dr Findlay•s citing of a specimen contract has already been noted a+-P.z-s 
ante. The following further grounds for dismissal were also enumerated 
(1) Any breach of Security requirements (2) any serious or wilful 
breach concer ning State property (3) negligence in duties (4) becomes 
inefficient or incompetent as a result of his own wrongful conduct 
(5) liquor or drugs in excess (6) becomes bankrupt or makes any 
assignment or arrangement for the benefit of his creditors (7) guilty 
of scandalous or improper conduct (8) guilty of any act or omission 
likely to prejudice ••••• interests of the Crown or the Security Service, 
except an act ordered by or on behalf of the Director, in the case of 
an act performed as so ordered. 
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virtue of subsection one of section eight neither the Director, 
nor the officers nor the employees of the Service enjoy any of the
~~ 
considerable protection and security of position afforded by a pub
lic 
servant by the appeal procedure established in the State Services 
Act 
It is difficult to envisage, in spite of the contrary submissions 
delineated above, that the Service could be other than contractual
. 
An appropriately worded contract, revealed in a schedule, could ob
viate 
the fears of the critics. Flexible dismissal procedures are obvi
ously 
necessary in security work. However the Legislatmre has sought, 
in 
the case of former public servants, to provide for some continuity
 
and security of employment, and in this area at least has removed 
any suspicion that renewal will be used as a goad.
50 Further, it is 
implicit in the terms of the Director's appointment that the l egis-
lature has envisaged this position as being terminable only in 
exceptional and clearly defined situations.
51 
50 s.10 of the Act. 
51 S.5 "Director of Security •••• (2) The Director of Security shall be 
appointed by the Governor-General, and (subject to subsection (4) 
of this section) shall hold office on such terms and conditions as
 the 
Governor-General determin• ••• 
(4) The person employed as Director of Security immediately before 
the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been appointe
d 
under the section, and shall hold office on the same terms and 
vonditions as are specified in the agreement under which be was so
 
employed unless and until he agrees to accept other conditions." 
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The statutory position of the present Director is singular. The 
security of tenure which he enjoys is considerable, for he may 
only be removed by Act of Parliament, or under the terms of a 
contract which is not appended to the Act, and has never received 
legislative approva1.
52 Even a Judge of the Supreme C0 urt 
may be removed by an address by the House of Representatives. 
This independence and special status is not accidental and accords 
with the theory outlined earlier in this article.
53 
Considerable comment was made in the House on the necessity 
for the officers of the Service to be of a high calibre. Reference 
has already been made in this article to this factor as a means of 
ensuring a judicious and liberal interpretation of the Service's 
duties.
54 It is surprising that no opportunity was taken in debate 
in the House to clarify this matter. There is some cogency in the 
suggestion that men or women trained in the so-called "libreral 
studies" could ensure that the evaluation functions of the Service 
were exercised in an equitable manner.
55 
52 Dr Findlay ( ra,-1.A;Je, a1rs.U~"'~°'"'<::&.1t4 ) has indicated that the terms 
are similar to those outlined in footnote 49. 
53 See P• :z.-i The Ganadian "Royal Commission" Report also argued 
that independence was needed, i.e. "This individual must rest on some 
security of tenure•••• and upon clear and public terms of reference 
which include provision for the disclosure of information at his 
discretion." (my emphasis.) 
54 
P• 5'0 . 
55 
froporl-io -., 
It has been intimated to the writer that a considerable }M!'-Opoei tian 
of the officers of the Service do have degrees, in various disciplines, 
including politieal science. 
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Security Appeals: 
Sections fourteen to twenty-four which make provision for 
an appeal procedure, were included after representations w.,,e 
made to the Statutes Revision Committee. A number of countries 
have instituted such appeal procedures, none of which are as far 
reaching in their jurisdictional provisons. 
In the United Kingdom, where a civil servant has been the 
subject of an adverse security report,
56 the Minister must decide 
whether or not their is a prima facie "case". If it is decided 
that the allegations have substance, the persons concerned should 
be provided with some details. Mr Atlee stated in 1948 that the 
civil report "should not merely be informed that he is suspected, 
but should be given, as far as possible, chapter and verse saying 
"You are a member of this organisation. You did this or that, 
can you explain it?" He ought to have the case put before him 
perfectly clearly."
57 Sources of information were not to be 
5 Judicial review was rejected on four grounds: (1) the need to avoid 
disclosure of continuing investigations; (2) the criteria on which 
Security findings are made (relating to reliability), do not neces-
sarily relate to matters which can be tested by rules of evidence used are 
in a court of law; (a ) decisions in these mattersA ultimately the 
responsibility of the State and cannot be surrendered to the courts. 
(i.:)Permanent Heads remain responsible for security in their departments, 
and cannot be bound by outside decision. 
57 See Williams "Not in the Public Interest": pub. Hutchinson. 
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revealed however. Fourteen days are allowed for reply. If the 
Minister does not then vary his ruling, a further 7 days must be 
allowed for communication of whether or not an appeal will be made to 
the Advisory Body. 58 This body is comprised of 3 retired civil 
servants, (none of whom, as yet, have had any legal training). 
Originally representation was not allowed, and even now remains 
limited to the preliminary hearing. The civil servant may adduce 
witnesses, but he has no power of 1 sub-peona', nor may he hear 
the security authority's witnesses (and is thereby effectively 
deprived of any right of cross-examination or refutation). The 
Minister may take such action as he deems fit on the resulting report. 
58 This preliminary procedure is similar to what precedes, in some 
instances, a difficult or doubtful security clearance in New 
Zealand • On occasions the individual concerned will be ~BteP-
. ~,.,,·-...ucol 
i.l¼tPeQQ88Q 1 and Departmental Heads will be told, IRa factually, 
of the difficulties involved, in any ensuing recommendationo 
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In the United States (as opposed to both the U
nited Kingdom 
and New Zealand) every person entering civilia
n employment may 
be the subject of a security investigation. A pr
ima facie case is 
presented, by the secutity authorities, to a "l
oyalty board" of three 
P~•c,. 
or more Jle-f),l'e<s,e.a;l;a.:li i..iies. If the decision is adver
se, the subject 
is served with a written notice setting forth 
the charges "as 
specifically and completely as, in the discret
ion of the agency, 
security considerations permit.
1159 The individual is given the 
right to reply in writing to the charges and i
s also entitled to an 
administrative hearing before the "loyalty boa
rd" at which he may 
appear personally, and; f ccompanied by counsel 
or representatives 
of his own choosing and present evidence on
 his own behalf. 
"Sensitive agencies" are exempted from this pa
rticular procedure, 
but havqanalogous provisions. In 1950 the prov
isions relating to 
the "ac>yalty Programme" were combined with tho
se relating specifically 
- 60 
to security matters . 
The most notable feature of the New Zealand sy
stem, in comparison 
to those of the United Kingdom and the United 
States, is the right of 
appeal given to people outside the Public Serv
ice, and not merely to 
the employees of independent contractors emplo
yed in high "security-
risk" projects. By virtue of section 17 
of the Act, the Commissioner 
59 8 Vol. 5, Y.L.R. p. 31. "Loyalty among G vernment Emplo
yees", 
0 
Emerson and Helfeld. 
60 
Public Law 733. 
61 To whom the provisions of the system in the United K
ingdom was 
extended to cover in March 1957. It is notabl
e that there is no statutory 
provision whatever relating to these matters i
n that country. 
i. 
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has a duty t~'inquire into complaints made in accordance w
ith 
this Act by any person ordinarily resident in New Zealand 
that 
his career or livelihood is or has been adversely effected
 by an 
act or omission of the New Zealand Security.Intelligence S
ervice.u6
2 
The New Zealand equivalent of the procedures relating to c
ivil 
servants above is contained in section 38 of the State 
Services Act 1962, which provides as follows: 
••••" (1) If the Commission i s of t he opinion that any off
icer 
should be transferred in t h e interests of nat i onal securit
y, it 
shall furnish the officer with a statement in writing setting 
the reasons for its opinion as they may be properly disclo
sed 
having regard to the interests of national security." 
The officer shall then have f ourteen days in which to deci
de 
whether or not he will agree to transfer. If he does not, 
he must 
either resign or request the Security Review Authority to 
investigate 
the matter.
7 
62F b · t t . . t . ht f or o vious reasons no pro ec i on was given o any rig so 
individual privacy. The comments on techniques (p. ~3. Ml'M1 
are relevant here. Because of the difficulties of defini
tion, any 
1""'p .... ., .. ,.,., 
im~gniog of reputation was not included as grounds for compl
aint. 
This means that some people, (such as housewives) could be
 deprived of 
any remedy, unless there was an action in ~efamation. 
63 No provision is made in section 38 regarding the procedure to be 
followed if the appeal • isallowed, although by inference f
rom the detaileo( 
provisions relating to transfer on confirmation of any sec
urity report, 
it is probable that no further action would be taken. U
nder the 
equivament section~"the Public Service Act (S.7 of the 1951
 Amendment), 
the ultimate decis i on resided in the Commission. 
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Subsection three of section thirty-eight provides that in 
arriving at its conclusions"the Security Review Authority shall 
hear in private evidence tendered by the Commission and any 
other witnesses, and shall give the officer concerned an opportunity 
to be heard, and may permit him to be represented by counsel or any 
other person and have other persons to testify as to his record, 
reliability and character, and may receive such other eY¥ evidence 
as it think fit, Whether admissible in a court of law or not. 
The Security Review Authority shall regulate its procedure in such 
manner as it thinks fit." 
Officers of the Public Service in New Zealand have, hence, 
similar rights of review in such matters as do those in the United 
Kingdom. Notably however no provision is made for those who have 
been refused employment on security grounds. The position would be 
similar in the United States and the United Kingdom, as both systems 
outlined above apply only to those already in employment. The most 
pertinent provis i on in all three systems, is that some minimal 
indication of the substance of any allegations must be given to the 
person concerned. However, it is alleged in the United Kingdom that 
little or no effort is made to do this, and any protection afforded 
a civil servant is tkitiated by this denial of information.
64 
64 Street "Freedom, the Individual and the Law", pub. Penguin, Chap. 8. 
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If there is a right of appeal under section 38, the machinery 
• "'5 
set up under the Security Intelligence Service Act cannot be used. 
Section seventeen is intended to give •~ redress, however 
rudimentary, where present procedures are inadequate. The appeal 
provisions are palpably wider than any existing under any other 
common law jurisdiction, but they do not obviate all the criticisms 
made against the procedures available elsewhere; nor do they give 
any substantial promise of redress in a number of areas where civil 
liberties are most vulnerable. 
To what extent does wide jurisdiction given the Commissioner 
give adequate protection to individual rights and interests? 
Theoretically any person who has applied for a position in the 
State Services, may 4 appeal( if he suspects he has been denied the 
post on security grounds) under section seventeen. • 
65 S.19 (2): "If in the course of his inquiries it appears to the 
Commissioner (a) That there is an adequate remedy or right of 
appeal under section 38 of the State Services Act 1962, or other-
wise •••• he shall refuse to inquire into the matter further. 
P• 
:.. 
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Practically however such a person will ' have difficulty in sub-
stantiating his claims; me re conjecture that security reasons 
have adversely affected him may not be regarded as sufficiently 
substantial grounds for an inquiry.
67 Those both within and out-
side the Public Service who are subjected to positive vetting will 
know they are undergoing a security check, and will hence be in a 
better position should they wish to appeal. However, any subsequent ,~ 
denial of promotion could be attributed to other causes. The 
difficulties inherent in this area are even more vividly apparent 
where a citizen is unaware of any investigation of his associations 
or activities. Arguably, as the Service is to co-operate (by 
virtue of section four),
69 
with State Services and public authorities 
only, such inquiries could in no way jeopardise the career or liveli-
hood of a citizen. However other "rights" are involved here. 
The citizen, indirectly, is having his freedom of association, 
and his individual privacy, circumscribed. Such investigations 
are an extension of executive power which the individual cannot be 
expected to endure unless he has some opportunity to defend himself 
against any allegations. 
67 By virtue of section 19 the Commissioner may refuse to inquire 
into any complaint if it is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or not 
made in good faith. 
68 Probably however any denial would lead to an appeal under the 
State Services Act 1962, and the grounds for refusal would have to be 
revealed and justified. 
69 p. ~ ~ ante. 
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While it is reassuring that whatever material is procured will 
normally only be communicated in situations where there is an 
70 
avenue of redress, concern may still be aroused by the potential
 
damage which an agency such as the Service with its wide 
discretion and possession of sensitive material, could wreak. 
No person should be placed in such a vulnerable position without s
ome 
opportunity ~if this is at all possible, to defend himself.
71 
70 By virtue of the State Services Act1 various appeal boards, 
and the equivalents for other public authorities. 
71 "We cannot approve any use of official powers or position to 
prejudice, injure or condemn a person in liberty, property or good
 
name, which does not inform him of the source and substance of 
the charge and give a timely and open-minded hearing as to its 
truth": Mr Justice Jackson. "The Task of maintaining civil 
liberties" 8m Bar Assoc. Journal XXXIX. 
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The whole apparatus of appeal is invalidated to a considerable 
'1-... ., 
extent by the absence of ~otification. The most glafteiRg omission 
in the Act is the lack of any provision~~f ( even the most rudimentary) 
._ ..If'. A t • d • t • t L. ,tp f 1 1 • t f Ra~~~ ~ , TOL any power o in ica e, ei 1,er~an unsuccess u app ican or 
a position in the State Services, or to any individual on whom a sec-
urity report has been completed, that certain of their actiuities 
have rendered them "security risks". No reiteration of the 
novelty of the appeal procedure itself can serve to hide this 
essential weaknes§, Obviously, not all persons on whom an 
adverse security report has been made can be notified. While the 
powers of communication
72 are exercised only to convey security 
material to "State Services and other public authorities", only 
those people whose rights were being affected in any material way 
72 For it is by communic&t~on that interests beyond that of 
privacy, are endangered, e.g. reputation, livelihood. 
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by such communication should, prima facie, be entitled to notification. 
Arguably for example, any person who has been denied emplo1ment by 
a State department or public authority on security grounds, should 
be notified, not because an individual has any right to be employed 
by the State, but because he should not be impugned without redress. 
If one is charged with a crime, there is a right of f4ar trial. 
A person who has been labelled as lazy may demonstrate his diligence 
in another job. A "security risK" however may be adversely affec'ted 
and never be aware of it, or in a position to rid hinself of such 
an impediment. Equally if naturalisation is denied on security 
grounds, it would seem equitable to allow the person concerned some 
indication of the factors involv@a. 73 It is no defence, where 
individual rights are concerned, to allege that the numbers involved 
are infinitesimal. Nor can immunity from challenge be given to any 
governmental agency whose discretion is as wide, unregulated and 
crucial as that of the Security Intelligence Service. 74 
73 Under section 19 (c) the Commissioner may refuse to inquire into 
a complaint on the grounds that the complainant is not a New Zealand 
citizen. Hopefully this would not be used in naturalisation cases. 
In any event the power is a narrowing of the ambit S.17 (d), because .. 
any"person ordinarily resident in New Zealand is therein empowered 
to make a complaint. (No provision is made for appealing against denials 
of entry, on the grounds that information obtained from foreign author-
ities could not be revealed, and it would be difficult to obtain any 
other substantiating material - Parliamentary Debates. Vol ~,z .) 
74 
See P• ante. 
11 
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Notification may not always be practicable, even within 
the situations delineated above. Given, however, that adverse 
reports are not numerous and that a portion of these could 
unquestionably be categorised as unsuitable for notification, it 
would not be too burdensome, should doubt remain in any particular 
instance in the "open" categories, for reference to be made to the 
Minister. Only within the most stringently drawn limits can the 
requirements of natural justice be ignored , 
The manner in which the proceedings of the Commission are to be 
run is outlined in section twenty. While these provisions have the 
virtue of flexibility, and allow the complainant to be represented, 
to call witnesses, and to refuse cross-examination, the citizen 
is still denied rights which are considered fundamental in a criminal 
trial. It is paradoxical that non-criminal activities, may, by virtue 
of a security service report, jeopardise a subject's career and 
livelihood, yet he is deprived of the safe-guards which are guaranteed 
those accused of the most felonious acts. 75 Even if notification 
remai ~ confined to persons transferred for security reasons within the 
Public Service, it would seem only just that those who have made a 
75 F9r example cross-examination. In some instances (for example in 
relation to "character defects") the evidence may be that of family or 
"'* . 
neighbours. Why should we-t such people11 be., cross-examined? Harry 
Street comments in "Freedom, Individual and the Law. " (op. cit.) 
Why should a person charged with treason be allowed to confront his 
accusers and yet a person about to be dismissed because he is likely to 
commit treason, be denied those minimum judicial rights?" 
.1. 
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complaint to the Commissioner, should be furnished with some 
indication of the nature of allegations made in any security 
report: Section nineteen will prevent the appeal procedure 
being used as a means of satisfying idle curiosity. 76 
Admittedly any elaboration made available to the complainant 
could endanger sources of information or inquiries relating 
to other persons that are still continuing, and should hence 
remain within the discretion of the Commissioner. However, if 
it is possible to provide reasons (under S.38 of the State Services 
Act) for the transferral of a public servant, it should be possible 
once the Commissioner has~reed to review a case, to~!:_~ 
details to a complainant. 76a A valuable power, which is relevant 
to the preceding comment, is contained in subsection six of section 
,t 
twenty, i.e . ..... the Commissioner may summon before him and examine 
on oath any person, and may administer an oath". By such means the 
Commissioner could examine the "sources" of information without 
endangering their continued usefulness, or anonymity. Verification 
4'1'1 
could be obtained judicious questioning of the complainant, or.. other 
person who might provide relevant evidence. 
76
a The Canadian "Royal Commission" Report, op. cit. suggests that such 
details should include, if possible of factors which have entered 
the recommendation, e.g. membership of associations, residence of 
relations and character defects. The re port asserts that it should 
be relatively simple to indicate relevant factors without disclosing 
sources. 
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Section fourteen stipulates that the person to be appointed 
as Commissioner of Security Appeals "shall be a barrister or solicitor 
of the Supreme C~urt of not less than seven years' practice, 
whether or not he holds or has held any judicial office." 
This is a considerable improvement"' on the practice established 
in the United Kingdom, for there is a greater likelihood that a 
protection akin to that afforded to the accused in a court of law 
..,1 
will be instituted by such a person, 
Section nineteen outlines the Commissioner's discretionary 
power to refuse to inquire into any complaint. Presumably 
"trivial"complaints are those where no really deleterious effects 
on a complainant's livelihood or career are indicated . ½R tae ggmplaint. 
It is difficult to understand why a complaint may be rebuffed merely 
becfause it is "vexatious". Obviously a great number of complaints 
will appear "vexatious"; such assaults on administrative decisions 
are often so regarded. Any complaint of substance would seem to warrant 
some investigation whether or not it is, or is intended to be, 
vexatious. 1178 
Section twenty-one contains a valuable provision for the reference 
of any evidence of breach or misconduct on the part of any employee 
or Officer to the D;rector. An additional safeguard could hafe been 
77 Given the relative flexibility of procedure under sectimn fwenty. 
78 Section 19 (1) (b) could be construed in contradistinction to S.19 
(1) (a), and be read as intending to exclude anything which is merely 
vexatious. Nevertheless, the objection stands, that investigation 
should follow if the complaint has any 
substance. 
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f""'"'~,,( to the effect that any ultra vires Act, or dubious procedure which 
is uncovered, must also be forwarded to the Director and to the 
Minister. 
Once the Commissioner has completed his investigation be must 
forward his "findings regarding the complainant 11 , ( together with the 
relevant documents and materials) to the Minister. 79 Section twenty-
two stipulates that the Minister retains an absolute discretion 
whether or not to take any action. This could be considered justi-
fiable on the grounds that the ultimate responsibility for national 
security resides in the Government. The matter cannot be bought 
into public debate, by way of publicat i on or broadcasting unless 
either the Minister has given his written consent, or it arises 
in debate in the House of Representatives.
80 Presumably it was 
considered that this was the point at which, however • nugatory 
it may render the appeal procedure, concession must be made to the 
requirements of national security and reliance placed in the 
Minister's judicious exerfise of his discretion. It is possible 
that in blatant cases of denial or justice, the Commissioner himself 
might resign as a means of protest. It is unlikely that a question 
in the House would elicit any reply in cases where the Minister had 
refused to act; nevertheless, incessant questions might be useful 
79s.21. Section 20 (a) provide that "no proceeding, report, or 
finding of the Commissioner shall be challenged, reviewed, quashed or calle 
called in question in any court." 
Bo S.23: Surely if a person is cleared be should be free to publish 
at least this fact ~ ? 
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as a means of arousing public concern, for these, and any reference 
made to appeal proceedings in the House, are not subject to the 
S-w-•~Nr4S 
stPietfteea 00Rtai aea i ~ seGt i en t weflt~ taPee, on publication and 
Clearly the appeal procedure, ¼8P as this appraisal has attempted 
to indicate, is faulty and unsatisfactory. Nevertheless a consider-
able effort has been made to provide some redress in a manner which 
does not compromise security procedures. The caution may however 
have been exeessive. It is wise in examining legislation such as 
this to remember that it is for Parliament to justify the invasion 
of civil liberties which the existence of a Security Service implies, 
and not for the citizen to search for redress against the inexorable 
infringement of his freedom. 
III. Prihces that will but hear, or give access, 
To such officious spies, can n'er be safe, 
The~ake in poison with an open ear, 
And, free from danger, becomes slaves to fear." -
Ben Jonson 
New Zealand has been fortunate that its comparative political 
calm and minor strategic and military importance has produced few 
manifestations of a preoccupation with security and secrecy. 
Nevertheless a flavour of paranoia taints the arguments of both 
protagonists and opponents of a state security system. It is well 
to rmember therefore that tolerance of divergence and the temperence 
of rational men provide the most effective protection against the 
sedulous and insidious efforts of the reactionary and revolutionary 
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alike. It is essential to encourage within society the fea
rless 
expression of personal opinion, with the minimum of res
triction. 
By removing the Security Service from limbo, giving it 
statutory 
foundation, subjecting it to scrutiny and providing so
me opportunity 
for redress against the infringement of individual 
interests, the 
Legislature has demonstrated, in cautious fashion, 
a desire to promote 
such a sane climate. It is beholden upon the citiz
en to show a 
complementary vigilance, and thereby ensure his unh
indered exercise 
of freedom of association and expression. No man
's freedoms will 
remain inviolate, least of all when they are neglec
ted. 
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